Designing Incentives for Unobservable Effort: A Case Study on Performance-Based Pay

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dc.contributor.author Alin, James
dc.contributor.author Datu Eranza, Datu Razali
dc.date.accessioned 2024-12-16T04:33:22Z
dc.date.available 2024-12-16T04:33:22Z
dc.date.issued 2024-12-16
dc.identifier.uri http://oer.ums.edu.my/handle/oer_source_files/2915
dc.description.abstract Imagine a delivery driver for a logistics company who can choose between two levels of effort: (1) go the extra mile (high effort) or (0) stick to the basics (low effort). The employer cannot directly observe the driver’s effort but can measure performance based on delivery outcomes. The outcomes are either on-time delivery or late delivery. If the driver exerts high effort, deliveries are made on time 60% of the time and late 40% of the time. If the driver exerts low effort, deliveries are always late. Table – Delivery Performance Outcomes Effort Level On-Time Delivery Late Delivery High Effort 60% 40% Low Effort 0% 100% Task: How should the logistic ensuring fairness? en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.title Designing Incentives for Unobservable Effort: A Case Study on Performance-Based Pay en_US


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